“Bin Laden’s dislike of the US and anything Western was being firmed up at that time, and crystallized when the Saudi government allowed the US to build up its military strength in Saudi Arabia before the Gulf War of 1991.
Bergen thus joins the ranks of those who are highly critical of the notion that the US ‘made bin Laden who he is.’
Bergen discusses the activities with which bin Laden’s name became associated. These include the attacks that were made in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the embassy bombings in East Africa, the time spent in the Sudan, his return to Afghanistan where he was protected by the Taliban, the first attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, and the bombing of the USS Cole. Bergen has a great deal to say about the horrors of 9/11.”
Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden ( 2001),
Aparece nuevamente una relación entre los aparatos del Estado –en este caso EEUU y los intereses personales del crimen organizado. En esta situación un grupo terrorista –el de Bill Laden. Con la confluencia de ambos intereses en un tercer elemento –la geopolítica contra Rusia. Al desaparecer este factor estatal, o debilitarse, Al Qaeda dirige su atención al World Trade Center, o las zonas de Afganistán.
Dirá Peter Berger en un artículo aparecido en The Washington Post en el año 2006: que esta organización no solo permanece encerrada en en el area de Afganistan/Paquistan sino que proyecta su ideología al conjunto de los grupos terroristas a escala mundial: “almost five years after the attacks on Washington and New York, al-Qaeda not only remains in business in its traditional stronghold on the Afghan-Pakistan border, but continues to project its ideology and terrorism abroad. So now we face a world of ideologically driven homegrown terrorists -- free radicals unattached to any formal organization -- in addition to formal networks such as al-Qaeda that have managed to survive despite the tremendous pressure brought to bear against them since 9/11”.
El siguiente elemento a considerer, consiste en preguntarse, si los grupos terroristas que están encerrados en dicho territorio pueden ser mantenidos dentro de esa caja de seguridad, o debordaran con su actividad un mundo globalizado: según Berger “we are told that September 11 was as much a product of plotting in Hamburg as in Afghanistan; that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are quite distinct groups, and that we can therefore defeat the former while tolerating the latter; that flushing jihadists out of one failing state will merely cause them to pop up in another anarchic corner of the globe; that, in the age of the Internet, denying terrorists a physical safe haven isn't all it's cracked up to be.
These arguments point toward one conclusion: The effort to secure Afghanistan is not a matter of vital U.S. interest. But those who make this case could not be more mistaken. Afghanistan and the areas of Pakistan that border it have always been the epicenter of the war on jihadist terrorism--and, at least for the foreseeable future, they will continue to be”.
En la búsqueda de un consenso con respecto a la globalización del terrorismo y del crimen organizado, podríamos decir que La Guerra de Afganistán y su Mercado del opio, son en sustancia un elemento, de ese 20% del comercio mundial que altera los intercambios, las propiedades y genera un flujo monetario que re circula el sector financiero.
Para aumentar la seguridad mundial, debemos recurrir a mayores inversiones en armas y guerras, las cuales generan un negocio y una agenda de conflictos futuros. Pero las organizaciones criminales se integran en dicho esfuerzo, desde sus relativos intereses ideológicos o particulares. Al Qaeda y Bill Laden medran en los Estados Fallidos (Afganistán, Somalia, etc.) para consolidar su perspectiva personal de negocio.
Un círculo que se alimenta.
